



Free Indirect Style and Interior Monologue Revisited

Couturier Maurice

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**"Free Indirect Style
and Interior Monologue Revisited"**

by
Maurice COUTURIER
Université de Nice

The debate which Charles Bally opened in 1912 with his important essay "Le style indirect libre en français moderne I et II," is far from closed.¹ Ann Banfield has recently given it a new momentum with her excellent book, *Unspeakable Sentences*, in which she convincingly demonstrates the linguistic kinship of so-called interior monologue and so-called free indirect style which she felicitously calls "represented speech and thought." In her view, represented speech and thought is not so much a mimetic device as a "distinct style."² As we hope to show in the following pages, this style, which is characterized above all by the mixture of oral and written forms, is eminently writerly. It more or less obliterates the difference, the distance, between "énoncé" and "énonciation," story and discourse, and produces a strong poetic effect.

Here is an example of represented speech taken from *Bleak House*; it is the transcription of the dialogue between the coroner and Jo after Nemo's death:

Name, Jo. Nothing else that he knows on. Don't know that everybody has two names. Never heard of sich a think. Don't know that Jo is short for a longer name. Thinks it long enough for *him*. *He* don't find no fault with it. Spell it? No. *He* can't spell it. No father, no mother, no friends.³

It is comparatively easy to recover the original utterances of the interlocutors. The coroner's "you's" have been deleted, Jo's "I's" and "me's" have been translated as "he's" and "him's." Nothing else has been changed, and yet this passage is neither direct speech, since these pronominal transcriptions have been made, nor reported speech, since many traces of oral speech have been retained (faulty pronunciation, faulty grammar, question marks, italics simulating emphasis).

As for interior monologue, which Ann Banfield calls represented thought, it reads like an accurate transcription of a character's stream of consciousness. It was first defined in 1931 by Dujardin as follows:

The interior monologue is, in the order of poetry, the unspoken discourse without an audience, by which a character expresses his most intimate thought, that closest to the unconscious, prior to all logical organization, that is to say, in its nascent state, by means of direct sentences reduced to a syntactic minimum.⁴

We'll return to this definition later, but let's us give two examples to show that this label can apply to different styles. The first example is taken from *Ulysses*:

One of those chaps would make short work of a fellow. Pick the bones clean no matter who it was. Ordinary meat for them. A corpse is meat gone bad. Well and what's cheese? Corpse of milk.⁵

This passage from Bloom's interior monologue perfectly illustrates Dujardin's definition: the disarticulated text seems perfectly to simulate the unfolding of the thoughts, images, and impressions in Bloom's mind. Yet, it does not deserve to be called represented thought, but rather something like "direct thought," since writerly forms have been totally supplanted by oral forms. Naturally, the relationship between direct thought and represented thought is not the same as that existing between direct speech and represented speech though the syntactic transpositions are basically the same. Bloom's interior monologue is not a monologue proper, but only an approximation, a representation of his stream of consciousness.

In the following passage from *Mrs Dalloway*, on the other hand, we are confronted with true represented thought:

Like a nun withdrawing, or a child exploring a tower, she went upstairs, paused at the window, came to the bathroom. There was the green linoleum and a tap dripping. There was an emptiness about the heart of life; an attic room. Women must put off their rich apparel. At mid-day they must disrobe. She pierced the pin-cushion and laid her feathered yellow hat on the bed.⁶

Here we do not have the crude thoughts of Clarissa but rather their writerly transcription.

Until recently, most of the studies on this subject written in English dealt above all with so-called stream of consciousness and were undertaken by critics interested more in psychology than in poetics or criticism, as the following titles clearly indicate:

Frederick J. Hoffman, *Freudianism and the Literary Mind*, 1945

Robert Humphrey, *Stream of Consciousness in The Modern Novel*, 1954

Melvin Friedman, *Stream of Consciousness: A Study in Literary Method*, 1955

Erwin R. Steinberg, *The Stream of Consciousness and Beyond in Ulysses*, 1973.

It was more or less taken for granted that the novelistic style conveniently labelled "stream of consciousness," was the crowning achievement of the realistic novel, that its chief interest was psychological rather than aesthetic. Dorrit Cohn's interesting book, *Transparent Minds* (1978), though it relies heavily on linguistics, is largely based on the same assumption that these stylistic extravaganzas are merely meant to lay bare the complex functioning of the human mind.

The German critics, Frank K. Stanzel in *Die typischen Erzählsituationen im Roman*

(1955), Käte Hamburger in *Die Logik der Dichtung* (1968), were the first to take up the discussion where Bally and Dujardin had left it, and to adopt a purely narratological and linguistic approach to this difficult problem which is fast becoming the chief obsession of the critics at the moment. These two theorists do not claim to study these styles in terms of psychological realism but in terms of textual semiotics.

This is also what Ann Banfield does in *Unspeakable Sentences*: as her excellent title (which unwittingly echoes Barthele's *Unspeakable Practices, Unnatural Acts*) shows, she wants to emphasize the language rather than the "transparency of the mind." This book can be called the first true grammar of these two writerly discourses, earlier called free indirect style and interior monologue; it is the first to have scientifically shown that these two discourses share in fact the same grammar and that they are basically writerly styles far removed from natural language situations. Here is her conclusion:

There is thus something essential to fiction in its representation of consciousness. The linguistic cotemporality of PAST and NOW and the coreference of SELF and the third person supply a language for representing what can only be imagined or surmised - the thought of the other. By separating SELF from SPEAKER, this style reveals the essential fictionality of any representation of consciousness, of any approximation of word to thought, even of our own. Through it, language represents what can exist without it, yet which can scarcely be externalized except through language, but it does it without bringing this externalization to the level of speech.⁷

This passage summarizes the theory developed throughout her book, namely that represented speech and thought is a style which violates the laws of oral discourse. The narrator, who is the textual "speaker" (notice that Banfield is still using language borrowed from oral communication), seems to withdraw from the writing stage and to lend his voice to his protagonist (the "self" in Banfield's theory) who is thinking or speaking through it. This style creates, as it were, an impossible, a writerly subject; and yet it gives a more realistic representation of consciousness than previous literary styles. This paradox takes the form of a double bind in Banfield's last sentence: "Through it, language represents what can exist without it, yet which can scarcely be externalized except through language." This sounds very much like a reformulation of Rosset's theory of the "real" as something "without a duplicate."⁸ The "real" is beyond the reach of language, but it is only through language that it can be explored and eventually externalized.

The problem raised so brilliantly by Ann Banfield is therefore more complex than she already makes it. To investigate it in terms of communication, we are going to analyze a few

samples of represented speech and represented thought, in order to show that linguistics, which is a necessary instrument to disambiguate them, can't fully do justice to their extreme complexity, as Ann Banfield apparently hoped it could.

1 - Represented Speech

Represented speech is a comparatively old narrative style. One finds samples of it in *Pamela*: "He bowed, and put on his foreign grimaces, and seemed to bless himself! and, in broken English, told me, I was happy in de affections of de vinest gentleman in de varld!"⁹ This is not reported speech, though the grammar is that of reported speech: the second person has been translated as a first person, and the present tense as a preterit; there are traces of oral speech in the transcription of "the" into "de," and "finest" and "world" into "vinest" and "varld." The reader's job to recover the original speech is very easy in this case.

In the following passage from *Madame Bovary* the translation is more problematic:

On parla d'abord du malade, puis du temps qu'il faisait, des grands froids, des loups qui couraient les champs la nuit. Mlle Rouault ne s'amusait guère à la campagne, maintenant surtout qu'elle était chargée presque à elle seule des soins de la ferme. Comme la salle était fraîche, elle grelottait tout en mangeant, ce qui découvrait un peu ses lèvres charnues, qu'elle avait coutume de mordillonner à ses moments de silence.

First they spoke of the patient, then of the weather, of the great cold, of the wolves that infested the fields at night. Mademoiselle Rouault did not at all like the country, especially now that she had to look after the farm almost alone. As the room was chilly, she shivered as she ate. This showed something of her full lips, that she had a habit of biting when silent.¹⁰

The first sentence can't be called represented speech; it is simply a summary, by the omniscient narrator, of the first conversation between Charles and Emma after Monsieur Rouault's accident. The second sentence presents a difficult problem because it contains two words which seem to echo oral speech: the adverb "guère" ("not at all") which in French is somewhat colloquial, and the deictic adverb "maintenant" ("now") which co-occurs with an "imparfait." As Banfield shows, the use of colloquialisms and the co-occurrence of "maintenant" with a past tense in French are clear markers of represented speech and thought. We are therefore invited to translate this sentence into direct speech: "Je ne m'amuse guère à la campagne, maintenant surtout que je suis chargée presque à moi seule des soins de la ferme" (I do not at all like the country, especially now that I have to look after the farm almost alone). Grammatically speaking this translation is perfectly satisfactory, but psychologically it is not: how could Emma, a

comparatively reserved girl who has just left a convent, be so forthright with a young man the first time she meets him? She is too coy to beg for help so openly.

So, another interpretation must be proposed. Since this cannot be a transcription of Emma's words, what can it be? Within the sentence itself, we have one linguistic element which can guide us, "Mlle Rouault." When Charles arrived at the farm, Emma was referred to as "[u]ne jeune femme" ("a young woman") a neutral phrase which implies that at first Charles was not particularly impressed by her; then, two paragraphs later, she was called "Mlle Emma," obviously because of the presence of the maid who was watching her.¹¹ These two notations indicate that the referential tags are strictly coded and always reflect some observer's point of view.

We can therefore infer from this that the phrase "Mlle Rouault," in the sentence we are analyzing, reflects the point of view of Charles who is the only one present who would call her like this. Hence, we are induced to change our interpretation and to consider the sentence as a fragment of Charles's represented thought: while he was discussing with Emma the various subjects which are summarized in the first sentence, Charles gradually understood the girl's frustration and formulated it inwardly like this: "Mlle Rouault ne s'amuse guère à la campagne, maintenant surtout qu'elle est chargée presque à elle seule des soins de la ferme" (Mademoiselle Rouault does not at all like the country, especially now that she has to look after the farm almost alone), in which only the tense is different. Presumably, Charles is merely spelling out the unsaid (the object) of Emma's discourse when he says that to himself. Emma's frustration had to be manifest for dull-witted Charles to sense it intuitively. It is as if he had practically overheard the sentence which we thought we had recovered in direct speech: "Je ne m'amuse guère à la campagne. . . ."

To understand a text like this, the reader must make a number of educated guesses based, first, on his knowledge of a discursive grammar and, secondly, on his knowledge of human psychology. This apparently straightforward sentence turns out to have at least two word for word translations:

- Emma's direct speech,
- Charles's represented thoughts,

plus an embedding:

- Emma's represented thoughts as echoed in Charles's represented thoughts

There are not very many passages like this in Flaubert. In James's novels, on the other hand, they proliferate. For instance, in *The Bostonians*, we find the following report of a

conversation between Olive and Mr Pardon, one of the "young men" Olive so much disliked during the evening at the Tarrants':

The truth was, Miss Verena wanted to "shed" her father altogether; she didn't want him pawing round her that way before she began; it didn't add in the least to the attraction. Mr Pardon expressed the conviction that Miss Chancellor agreed with him in this, and it required a great effort of mind on Olive's part, so small was her desire to act in concert with Mr Pardon, to admit to herself that she did.¹²

It is comparatively easy, in the first sentence, to recover the words uttered by Mr Pardon: "The truth is, Miss Verena wants to 'shed' her father altogether; she doesn't want him pawing round her that way before she begins; it doesn't add in the least to the attraction." This is a good sample of represented speech in which traces of oral forms ("The truth was," "shed," "that way") are easy to identify.

The translation of the second sentence is far more difficult to make, simply because it is not represented speech but reported speech. In represented speech, there are enough echoes of the original utterance to recover most of the exact wording; not in reported speech which is a polished, writerly, transcription spelling out the meaning, rather than the actual wording, of the original utterance. It is often difficult to recover the oral utterance from a reported speech, especially when the speaker speaks in a truly oral style. Pardon probably said something like this: "I am sure, Miss Chancellor, you agree with me on this." In reported speech, the illocutionary force of the utterance must be spelt out ("Mr Pardon expressed the conviction"), not in represented speech where Pardon's words (assuming we recovered them properly) would read: "Mr Pardon was sure that Miss Chancellor agreed with him on this." But, as this sentence is clearly focused on Olive, we cannot say for sure what were Pardon's exact words. We only know what Olive's interpretation of them was, the illocutionary force being spelt out, and what reaction they induced in her: she hates to be of the same opinion as a man like him, so she has to answer in such a way as to keep her distance while admitting that he is probably right. Olive's original utterance cannot therefore be fully recovered, only the meaning she intended to put into it can be reconstructed.

Here again, as in the passage involving Charles and Emma, the situation is somewhat circular. Mr Pardon has understood, while talking with Olive, that the latter disapproves of the Tarrants; so, in order to build up a kind of complicity with this reserved, and possibly hostile, woman, he verbalizes what he thinks he overheard in her words. He spells out the abject of her discourse which will become later, in her dialogue with Verena, an open injunction: "Don't listen to *them*," meaning not only the young men, but also her parents. Olive is speaking, as it were, through Mr Pardon, but she is doing so perversely, forcing him to apologize for

verbalizing her own abject thoughts, as the rhetorical precaution at the beginning, "[t]he truth was," indicates.

To summarize, here is a tabulation of the various levels of discourse in this passage:

- Mr Pardon's direct address to Olive,
- Olive's secret thoughts about the Tarrants "overheard" by Mr Pardon,
- Mr Pardon's apologetic verbalization of Olive's secret thoughts.

The interesting thing in this extraordinary passage is that it induces the reader to undertake a transcription which is doomed to fail eventually. The narrative discourse does echo fragments of speeches and thoughts, but the reader cannot positively sort out the various discourses which have been so cleverly interwoven on the page. He minutely analyzes the words he is confronted with and tries to decide what voice, what or whose thoughts they transcribe. As he does so, he becomes more and more entangled in the syntax of the text and loses his confidence, realizing that he will never completely disambiguate the words on the page, that is to say turn them into plausible fragments of either oral or written discourse.

James's style here and elsewhere is eminently unspeakable, that is to say writerly: it shows a dramatic departure from oral discourse which, in the earlier stages of the modern novel, was still clearly present. However, if we want fully to appreciate or appropriate this kind of style, we must attempt these abortive transcriptions into oral discourse: that is how the "effet de réel," instead of vanishing, becomes more and more intense as we go on verbalizing. The reader can't disambiguate the text, he can only manipulate it in different ways, none of which is absolutely satisfactory. In the process, the secret of the text becomes more opaque and the author, who, we assume somewhat naïvely, is the ultimate keeper of this secret, becomes more elusive.

Nabokov, who is one of the most secretive and writerly novelists in history, repeatedly played games with these various writerly styles which we improperly call discourses. One of the most complex examples appears in *Transparent Things*; Person, the protagonist, has just joined Armande, his French-speaking future wife, and another girl, Julia, in a café:

An adjacent customer, comically resembling Person's late Aunt Melissa whom we like very much, was reading *l'Erald Tribune*. Armande believed (in the vulgar connotation of the word) that Julia Moore had met Percy. Julia believed she had. So did Hugh, indeed, yes. Did his aunt's double permit him to borrow her spare chair?¹³

In the first sentence, the adjacent customer is portrayed from different points of view:

- first from a narratorial point of view ("adjacent customer"),
- then from Person's point of view (he is the only one, we presume, who could have thought up the comparison with his late Aunt Melissa),
- and then from Person's family's point of view (they are the ones, we suppose, who like or liked the said aunt very much),
- and finally from Armande's point of view (she is the only French speaker, and we have been told that when she speaks English she tends to drop her aitches).

In the second sentence, Armande's words are easily recoverable: "I believe that you have met Percy." Is Nabokov's sentence a sample of represented speech? According to our criteria it is not, since it contains no traces of oral discourse. But our transcription erases the parenthesis which, we assume again, contains a narratorial aside: the narrator, who is acutely aware of the various meanings of the verb "to believe," specifies that the word must here be understood in its "vulgar connotation," as a synonym of "to think." He is therefore drawing our attention to the fact that this verb tends to have a different meaning in oral speech and present tense, and in represented speech and past tense where it generally means: "to have faith in." So, the status of the sentence is hard to decide: it has the structure of reported speech but the semantics of represented speech, the narrator stipulating that the verb "to believe" must be understood in the "vulgar connotation" it has in oral speech. Without this narratorial aside, which does not properly belong to the sentence proper, though it belongs to the textual utterance, we would have been compelled to read this sentence as reported speech.

The next sentences are again easy to transcribe as direct speech: "I believe I have. - So do I, indeed, yes." In this transcription, however, we have lost the little jingle in "So did Hugh, indeed, yes." In other words, the written transcription is also more oral than the direct discourse which we are invited to reconstruct: it contains alliterations and assonances which are not present in the "original," and this is somewhat paradoxical. As for the next sentence, it is a good example of represented speech in which a little fragment of Hugh's interior monologue concerning his "aunt's double" has been inserted.

Here, as in the other passages we have already analyzed, we notice that represented speech can get easily contaminated by represented thought which exactly shares its stylistic features, as Ann Banfield correctly shows. This writerly style makes it possible to string together echoes of true discourses (direct speech) and of non-discourses (so-called interior monologue) in one single textual utterance utterly devoid of syntactic breaks. It foregrounds the literariness of the text, its "effet de réel," by forcing the reader to "voice" the text, to perform it in different ways.

A text like this is never the voiceless picture that Derrida wants "l'écriture" to be, it is a mixed form which simulates numberless voices, narratorial and otherwise. In the passage from *Transparent Things*, three voices are audible in the second and the last sentences: the narratorial voice betrayed in the narratorial aside, the character's own voice (either that of Armande or that of Person), and finally the "thinker"'s mute comment (Person's thoughts about the "adjacent costumer" and his late aunt). The chief raison d'être of this writerly style is therefore to facilitate this extraordinary superposition and embedding of discourses and to erase the transitions between them on the page.

This style presents the reader with an almost impossible task. In order to make sense of these complex texts, we had to transcribe the written sentences into oral or pseudo-oral forms; but as we did so, we became more and more inextricably caught in the verbal mesh. We thought we were hearing countless voices, but in fact we were merely lending our own voice to the characters, as an actor does in a play. We have done nothing eventually but project ourselves onto the page, into the words, confusing the textual voices with our own. Such texts are gigantic ego-traps: they induce us to interact with them intensely, but, at the same time, they devour us. They fill us fleetingly with alien egos that need our intervention to exist but which eventually saturate our psyche.

Naturally, we are not fooled by the game: we love it because we have the blissful feeling, while playing like this with the text, of appropriating it, of making it our own. We have the pleasurable feeling that whatever we say about it, whatever translation we provide, is nothing but our own contribution to the text, or rather our own text, since the "true" text, the original speech, is ultimately unrecoverable for the simple reason that it has never been voiced. This cacophony of voices, which seems to give to the text an oral volume, eventually saturates it and exhibits its intensely writerly nature. The text, especially when it is so complex, becomes a mirror of ourselves; whatever we see through it pleases us immensely, gives us a great deal of narcissistic pleasure, even though, or because, our interpretative activity makes the author more inaccessible: the text is not only the author's property any more, it now belongs to us to a certain, undefinable, extent.

2 - Represented Thought

The case of interior monologue and stream of consciousness is even more complex. These two expressions refer to the same kind of literary style, but they describe it from different angles: interior monologue, like represented speech, is held to be a form of discourse; not a literary discourse, however, but the unvoiced discourse of a character's mind. Stream of

consciousness, on the other hand, views the same phenomenon from a psychological angle only as a chain of mostly unrelated ideas and images which freely circulate in a person's mind; it is very close indeed to the association of ideas celebrated by Locke and exemplified by Sterne in *Tristram Shandy*.

As we pointed out earlier, there are at least two extreme categories of novelistic styles designated by these two phrases: the well-structured Woolfian form of represented speech and the unspoken, disarticulate stream of consciousness, "direct thoughts," found in *Ulysses*, for example. Let's examine the opening of *Mrs Dalloway* which Ann Banfield also analyzed in her book:

Mrs Dalloway said she would buy the flowers herself.

For Lucy had her work cut out for her. The doors would be taken off their hinges; Rumpelmayer's men were coming. And then, thought Clarissa Dalloway, what a morning - fresh as if issued to children on a beach.¹⁴

Banfield's investigation of this opening is somewhat scanty. She notices that the first sentence probably contains indirect speech and that the "sentiments in the passage must be attributed to Mrs Dalloway and not to a narrator," but she does not really manage to account for the extreme complexity of this apparently straightforward opening.¹⁵ The first sentence can tentatively be translated as follows: "Mrs Dalloway said: 'I will buy the flowers myself.'" But only Lucy, the servant, would call Clarissa "Mrs Dalloway" here, as the servant was the only one who could refer to Emma as "Mlle Emma" in *Madame Bovary*. This would imply that the parenthetical phrase ("Mrs Dalloway said") echoes Lucy's thoughts and that the sentence in direct speech must be understood not from the speaker's but from the listener's point of view. This first paragraph, considered from this angle, would therefore be the transcription of Lucy's represented thought ("Mrs Dalloway is going to buy the flowers herself"), rather than that of Mrs Dalloway's reported speech ("I am going to buy the flowers myself").

Then, we begin to wonder whether Clarissa's own words were necessarily the ones we recovered in our translation. It is clear, in the next paragraph, that Clarissa needs to justify her decision to go and buy the flowers herself; she intimates that Lucy would probably have liked to do it herself, but that she overruled her for good reasons: "Lucy had her work cut out for her." Apparently, she didn't make this last comment to Lucy but only to herself, otherwise the conjunction "for" (which indicates that she is trying to justify her decision to herself) would be superfluous. There is a great deal of bad faith involved here: Clarissa senses intuitively that she may have hurt Lucy's feelings, though she probably took every precaution not to. Knowing her as we do after many rereadings of the novel, we very much doubt that she could have so openly snubbed a servant by saying: "I will buy the flowers myself." The reflexive pronoun was bound

to be somewhat insulting, implying as it necessarily did that she did not trust a servant to do it. If this interpretation, which is as linguistically grounded as that of Banfield but relies heavily on psychology and conversational maxims as well, is correct, then we cannot recover Clarissa's exact words, but only Lucy's thoughts.

The ambiguous status of these opening sentences was acutely felt by Virginia Woolf. She took the precaution at the end of the second paragraph of specifying that the scene is viewed from Clarissa's point of view ("thought Clarissa Dalloway") and not from that of Lucy. This is evidently a narratorial, or rather an authorial aside; if the author had written instead: "thought Clarissa," this could have been read as a translation of "thought I." So, it is impossible to recover the respective words and thoughts of Clarissa and Lucy in this passage; the same text is therefore liable to have more than one reading, to be supported concurrently by two subjects of enunciation, two speakers, in deep structure.

If such is the case, then it is difficult to subscribe to the principle stated by Banfield later in the same chapter:

- a. 1 E/1SELF. For every node E, there is at most one referent, called the 'subject of consciousness' or SELF, to whom all expressive elements are attributed. That is, all realizations of SELF in an E are coreferential.
- b. Priority of SPEAKER. if there is an *I*, *I* is coreferential with the SELF. In the absence of an *I*, a third person pronoun may be interpreted as SELF.
- c. If E is related anaphorically to the complement of a consciousness verb, its SELF is coreferential with the subject or the indirect object of this verb.¹⁶

If E is the textual expression ("Mrs Dalloway said she would buy the flowers herself," for instance), it is not true, as Banfield claims, that it has only one subject of consciousness; besides, the verb of consciousness, "thought," can have two different subjects in deep structure, as we have indicated ("thought Clarissa Dalloway," or "thought I"). So Banfield's concepts of SELF and SPEAKER, which are supposed to be linguistically grounded, are in fact terribly ambiguous.

It is ultimately impossible, as we have shown from the beginning, to adopt a purely linguistic approach to a text like this. This is where Banfield is probably mistaken. Represented speech and thought is a literary style, characterized by a number of linguistic features, identified correctly by Banfield, which violates the traditional principles of enunciation: for one textual sentence, there are two enunciatory processes, one which is oral, the other which is writerly, and therefore two selves (and sometimes more when many speakers are involved) which constantly switch parts. But the syntax of this style is so complex that, ultimately, the reader can

never separate completely the one from the other. This style flouts the laws of oral communication: it is unspeakable, because it is non-discursive, though it echoes or simulates many different discourses. It is a writerly style which cleverly manages to erase the discursive breaks and to muddle the enunciatory processes.

Bloom's monologue which we started to quote earlier, would not qualify as represented thought of course, openly exhibits its non-writerliness:

One of those chaps would make short work of a fellow. Pick the bones clean no matter who it was. Ordinary meat for them. A corpse is meat gone bad. Well and what's cheese? Corpse of milk. I read in that *Voyages in China* that the Chinese say a white man smells like a corpse. Cremation better. Priests dead against it. Devilling for the other firm. Wholesale burners and Dutch oven dealers. Time of the plague. Quicklime fever pits to eat them. Lethal chamber.¹⁷

This style is characterized by the absence both of anaphoric links, like deictic markers, between sentences, except at the beginning of the sixth sentence ("I read"), and of linguistic markers of illocution in general (verbs like "thought," "promised," "asked," "refused," or their nominalized equivalents).

Ann Banfield does not pay much attention to this form of style which seems to be to represented thought what direct speech is to represented speech. However, the homology is not as simple as it may seem: direct speech is an authentic discourse in which the anaphoric links, absent from Joyce's text, are everywhere present. Bloom's soliloquy is not a genuine soliloquy; it has little in common with the Shakespearian soliloquies in which characters address the audience more or less openly. At no time is the addressee designated, and this is logical since Bloom is supposed to be talking to himself, musing silently.

This non-discourse has its own rules, its own grammar: it is characterized by the almost systematic deletion of discursive markers. The reader is not considered, except in the sentence beginning with "I read," as the target of the text: his presence is utterly denied. The text proclaims textually (how could it do otherwise) its non-texthood. The reader is encouraged to turn it into a proper discourse in which the concatenation of words and thoughts would be fully motivated or accounted for; he is invited to investigate the sequence of words, images, and thoughts, while bearing in mind the pragmatic coordinates of the passage, and he is almost compelled to play the part of the analyst, rather than that of the linguist or critic.

This style induces the same kind of response on the reader's part as the "natural" style of conversation found in *The Bostonians*. By foregrounding at one and the same time its

non-writerliness and its solipsism, it invites the reader to consider the characters as more or less his patients. The "effet de réel," the "showing" effect, comes from the fact that the writing itself seems to vanish as it were. We have the uncanny feeling of being in the very presence of the unspeakable "real," Joyce's "whatness" or "quiddity," the "realhood" of which increases, instead of vanishing, as we start verbalizing it. As a result, the ghost of the inaccessible author becomes also more haunting for the reader.

This structural kinship between dialogue and the "unmediated" stream of consciousness like that of Joyce in *Ulysses* is made palpable in Virginia Woolf's *The Waves* which is totally written as verbalized, "dialogued," stream of consciousness. Here is a sample:

"That is my face," said Rhoda, "in the looking-glass behind Susan's shoulder - that face is my face. But I will duck behind her to hide it, for I am not here. I have no face. Other people have faces; Susan and Jinny have faces; they are here. Their world is the real world. The things they lift are heavy. They say Yes, they say No; whereas I shift and change and am seen through in a second. If they meet a housemaid she looks at them without laughing. But she laughs at me."¹⁸

This seems to be a straightforward dialogue: Rhoda is introduced in a narratorial aside which states that she is now speaking, though we don't know to whom. Rhoda's speech has all the characteristics of "natural" discourse: commentative tenses, "I" repeatedly used, implicit acknowledgment of the world as we know it. But she is not addressing anyone; and this is all the more clear here as she is looking at herself in a mirror and speaking to herself.

This is a blatantly unspeakable passage: it is a transcription in the form of dialogue of the kind of stream of consciousness we found in Bloom's soliloquy, but with no plausible addressee except a problematic analyst in the presence of whom she would be free-associating. Even this interpretation is wrong, however, for it is most unlikely that a girl of her age could string out such perceptive statements about herself. In fact, Virginia Woolf represents in well-structured language the kind of intuitions, of affects, of unconscious images which no one could verbalize, and which are by nature unspeakable, "real" in Lacanian terms. Rhoda does something here that no one, either child or adult, is capable of: she watches herself acting and thinking objectively as an analyst would do if he could use the magic ring which, in Diderot's *Les bijoux indiscrets*, can make its wearer invisible.

Of course, this is madness for the reader who, finding himself confronted with the bare unconscious of a group of strangers, feels himself terribly exposed. The problem, now, is not that of Rhoda and her friends, but that of the reader; this perverse text has burdened him with a task that he cannot cope with, but cannot set aside so conveniently either. He is caught in a

double bind: he can interpret this text only if he translates it into plausible discourse, but if he does so he betrays it because it is by nature non-discursive. There is no way he can posit himself satisfactorily.

When Dujardin said, as we saw earlier, that "The interior monologue is, in the order of poetry, the unspoken discourse without an audience," he laid his finger on the most important feature of this particular style.¹⁹ Represented speech and thought, a much better label, no doubt, than interior monologue and free indirect style, since it lays stress upon the linguistic kinship of these two literary discourses, is a poetic strategy developed in the modern novel, especially since Flaubert and James, to boost the "effet de réel," the showing effect of the text. It aims at severing the discursive links which traditionally allowed the reader to make contact with the author; it brings the reader to realize that the sentences are supported concurrently by two enunciatory processes, one oral, the other written. Hence this new definition of represented speech and thought which, in our opinion, accounts for all the characteristics of this style itemized by Banfield: represented speech and thought is an eminently writerly style which bears traces of oral discourse.

The passages we have analyzed in this chapter seem to have no audience because their indeterminacy, a term which Wolfgang Iser constantly uses in *The Implied Reader*, can't be liquidated. Naturally, they do have an audience, like poetry which is basically non-discursive: the imaginative and dexterous manipulator of words, who must be both an educated philologist like Barthes and a good discourse-analyst like Freud, Grice, or Watzlawick. The emphasis put by Lubbock on showing against telling sprang merely from the growing awareness, around the beginning of the century, that the novel was a literary genre which could, if creatively exploited, become intensely poetic. The typographic revolution had at long last left its stamp on the literary genre which it had made possible.

1 - Charles Bally, "Le style indirect libre en français moderne I et II," *Germanisch-Romanische Monatsschrift*, Heidelberg, 1912, pp. 549-56.

2 - *Unspeakable Sentences* (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982), p. 70.

3 - *Bleak House* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1971), P. 199.

4 - Quoted by Ann Banfield, *Unspeakable Sentences*, p. 136.

- 5 - *Ulysses* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1967), p. 35.
- 6 - *Mrs Dalloway* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1964), p. 35.
- 7 - *Unspeakable Sentences*, p. 260.
- 8 - Clément Rosset, *L'objet singulier* (Paris: Minuit, 1979), p. 25.
- 9 - *Pamela* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1980), p. 206.
- 10 - *Madame Bovary* (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1979), p. 49; Paul de Man's translation, *Madame Bovary* (New York: Norton Critical Edition, 1965), p. 11.
- 11 - *Ibid.*, p. 48 for the French text and pp. 10-1 for the translation.
- 12 - *The Bostonians* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1966), p. 111.
- 13 - *Transparent Things* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), p. 45.
- 14 - *Mrs Dalloway*, p. 5.
- 15 - *Unspeakable Sentences*, p. 66.
- 16 - *Ibid.*, p. 93.
- 17 - *Ulysses*, p. 116.
- 18 - *The Waves* (London: Granada, 1979), p. 29.
- 19 - Quoted in *Unspeakable Sentences*, p. 136.